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Abstract
In this study, I investigated the relationships between political identity, religious identity,
and national identity, as well as related attitudes about essentialism. I hypothesized that having
essentialist attitudes about one identity group will correlate with having essentialist attitudes
about other identities. I also predicted that the more important an identity is to one’s sense of
self, the more likely they will be to hold essentialist attitudes about that identity. Finally, I
predicted that having a Republican identity positively correlates with essentialist views of one’s
national identity. In this paper, I discuss the theoretical basis, as well as the method, sampling
procedures, limitations, and future directions.
Keywords:
Essentialism, Identity Centrality, Religion, Political Affiliation, Nationality
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Intercorrelations between Essentialist Beliefs and the Social Identities of Religion, Political
Affiliation, and Nationality
Essentialism is defined as “beliefs that a human group is natural, immutable, discrete,
informative, historically and cross-culturally invariant, and grounded in deep-seated, biological,
factors” (Skewes, et al., 2018, p. 1). The concept is important, as racial and gender essentialism
have been found to lead to racial (Mandalaywala, et al., 2018) and gender (Joyce & Walker,
2015) discrimination, respectively. However, a gap in the literature exists for other forms of
essentialism. The purpose of this study is to determine how essentialist beliefs about religion,
political affiliation, and nationality, respectively, correlate both with each other and with
identification with these types of social identities, both in terms of categorical identification (e.g.
“I am a Catholic”) and identity centrality, or how important their categorical identity is to their
sense of self (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Unlike race or gender, these three identities lack
socially recognized physiological or biological markers, which may be more obviously
associated with essentialism. Therefore, the essentialist elements of the identities used in this
study might not be as immediately clear, but still as important for understanding discrimination
and prejudice toward those of a different social identity. Further, a better understanding of the
psychological underpinnings of these essentialist beliefs, in general, could improve our
understanding of outcomes it has been shown to predict, such as discrimination, nationalism, and
polarization.
Essentialism and Social Identity
Categorical Identity Membership
Categorization is an important aspect of social interaction, as it allows us to perceive the
world around us more efficiently. However, this can lead to negative stereotyping and prejudice
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(Kang, 2015; Tajfel, & Turner 2004). Categorization is a requirement of essentialism, as it
provides the basic psychological structure, separate identities, that essentialist thinkers then view
as being fundamentally different. Recently there is an increased understanding of the
complexities of identity categories, such as multi-racial identities, non-binary gender and sexual
orientation identities, and intersectionality. One consequence of essentialist thinking is that it
fails to account for fluidity and intragroup variations in common identity categories (Kang,
2015).
Specific categorical identity memberships are also important, when it comes to predicting
essentialist beliefs. For instance, men are more likely than women to hold essentialist views of
gender (Smiler & Gelman, 2008). Of those men, this is especially true of those who report
greater conformity to masculine norms. However, essentialist thinking does not necessarily lead
to an individual thinking that their identity is the superior one. For example, Mandalaywala and
colleagues (2017) argue that essentialism is associated with both White and Black individuals
thinking of White people more highly than Black people. Although this research has found that
differences in essentialist thinking are predicted by holding common privileged identities with
socially constructed biological markers, there has been little research that has explored the effect
of categorical identity membership on essentialist views held about other types of identities.
Identity Centrality
Identity centrality is characterized by how important a specific identity is to one’s sense
of self (Holmes, et al., 2019; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Individuals have multiple identities,
for which they may hold different degrees of significance. Satherley and colleagues’ (2020)
found that political identity centrality is the strongest predictor of polarization. Both polarization
and essentialism are associated with perceiving an extreme separation between two identities.
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Unlike essentialism, however, centrality can also be associated with both positive and negative
outcomes, in terms of identity development. On the one hand, greater centrality toward an
identity may buffer against the psychological effects of discrimination (Cobb, et al., 2019).
Centrality can also predict behavior that is identity-protecting. For example, Whites with high
racial-ethnic identity centrality were more likely to vote for Donald Trump in 2020 (Blankenship
et al., 2021) and were more likely to hold far-right extremist views (Bai, 2020). Although
previous research has documented various outcomes of identity centrality, it has not as
rigorously examined to what extent centrality predicts essentialist beliefs about corresponding
identities.
Established Research on Psychological Essentialism
Previous research on essentialist beliefs has largely focused on a few key identities,
which tend to be associated with physiological traits that have socially-constructed significance
and meanings placed on them (e.g. skin color for race or voice pitch for gender). Identities that
are more choice-based (e.g. religion or politics) or otherwise non-physical (e.g. nationality) have
been under-represented in the extant research.
Gender-based Essentialism
Gender is highly essentialized, as one of the first social groups people are taught about at
a young age (Meyer & Gelman, 2016). To a person who holds essentialist beliefs, the genders are
viewed as biologically and socially distinct to a much greater degree than what is scientifically
true. Sex and gender are also conflated, with elements such as anatomy and reproduction being
inaccurately tied to gender. Gender is also seen as leading to significantly unique skills and traits
between genders. Essentialist beliefs are also associated with strong views in favor of system
justification, towards both traditional gender roles and the general status quo
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(Skewes, et al., 2018).
Race-based Essentialism
Race-based essentialism arises from differences in appearance between members of
different races. Essentialist views about race manifest in the belief that different racial groups are
biologically distinct, even though any two randomly selected people of any race will share at
least 99.9% of their DNA (Tawa, 2017). Stereotyping, or otherwise inferring attributes about
certain races, has been shown to be at least partially as a result of essentialist beliefs
(Mandalaywala, 2017). Examples include believing that certain races are inherently more
intelligent or more athletic than others. Essentialist beliefs towards race have also been linked
with prejudice, affecting an individual’s willingness to engage with outgroup members. Such
beliefs have been used to rationalize systems such as the Atlantic slave trade, by assigning
different levels of worth to different races (Tawa, 2017). Schmalor and colleagues (2021) found
that subjects were more likely to hold genes responsible for differences such as obesity or
criminality when the subject had highly essentialist views. There has been much research aimed
toward developing essentialism scales for race (Mandalaywala, et al., 2017, Yaylacı, et al.,
2019).
Sexual Orientation-based Essentialism
Unlike race and gender-based essentialism, sexual orientation-based essentialism lacks
immediately obvious physical markers. Additionally, research on the topic has often taken a
multi-faceted approach, with both pro- and anti-sexual minority applications. One aspect of
essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation includes believing that sexual orientation is
biologically determined and fixed across the lifespan (i.e., one is born with their sexuality and
does not choose it) (Morandini, et al., 2015). Another attribute of essentialist beliefs about sexual
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orientation involves seeing sexual orientation identities as discrete categories. Anti-essentialist
beliefs involve both seeing sexual orientation as a choice or dependent on outside factors, and
seeing it as fluid or on a spectrum. In contrast to race and gender essentialism, those with certain
essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation were found to hold more favorable attitudes toward
sexual minorities, as they did not believe sexual orientation to be a choice. However, one
subcomponent of this type of essentialism, believing that sexual orientation categories are
discrete or that those within a category are overly similar, was linked to intolerance towards
sexual minorities (Morandini, et al., 2015). Conservatives are more likely to believe that sexual
minorities are fundamentally different from heterosexuals but are less likely to believe that
sexuality is unchangeable (Hoyt et al., 2018). Morandini and colleagues (2015) found that gay
men who viewed sexual orientation as biologically-based and discrete had less uncertainty about
their sexual identity. Additionally, of those same gay men, those that believed sexual orientation
is biologically based had lower levels of internalized homonegativity, or acceptance that the
lower status of sexual minorities is justified, while those that believed in discrete categories of
sexual orientation had higher levels of internalized homonegativity. Grzanka and colleagues
(2015) had more complicated results than previous research, finding that students had more
contrast in their beliefs about the homogeneity, discreteness, and informativeness of sexual
orientation categories than in their beliefs about the naturalness of sexual orientation. Those
exhibiting multidimensional essentialist beliefs and those with the highest discreteness,
homogeneity, and informativeness beliefs had greater levels of homonegativity, in comparison to
those who with higher naturalness beliefs.
Combined, this research demonstrates how essentialist beliefs can not only shape one's
understanding of out-groups but can also shape one's understanding of their own in-groups.
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Therefore, research on the topic is important for understanding the attitudes of members of both
in-groups and out-groups.
Emergent Research on Other Types of Psychological Essentialism
I sought to study national, political, and religious essentialism because research on
essentialist beliefs about identity groups other than gender, race and sexual orientation, is
relatively sparse. This is surprising, since research on other identities has consistently shown that
essentialist beliefs have predictive power, in terms of in-group/out-group dynamics and how
individuals think and feel about their own social identity categories. While some researchers,
such as Eisenberg (2017), discussed some of these other groups briefly, as part of a more general
study on essentialism, few have looked at them directly. Newman and Knobe (2019) also
discussed the concept of generalized essentialism, but their paper was a meta-analysis,
comparing and contextualizing the findings of other researchers. Their contribution ends with an
explicit call for further research into other types of essentialism, believing there is much that still
needs to be examined.
In accordance with these recommendations, some emergent research, including by
Chaney & Sanchez (2018), has dove deeper into essentialism by examining the intersection of
previously studied forms of essentialist beliefs (e.g. racial and gender essentialism). However,
they still did not investigate other types of identities. Nimrod and Heine (2010) speak at length
on the ramifications of a general essentialist mindset, without directly examining the antecedents
of the phenomena or looking at essentialist beliefs of specific identities. In general, articles
discussing essentialist views of religious, nationality identities, or political affiliation are still
relatively rare, and thus worthy of future research.
In terms of religious essentialism, Toosi & Ambady (2011) found that Islam, Judaism,
and Hinduism were generally viewed as the most innate, while atheism and spiritualism were
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viewed as the least innate, with Catholicism, Buddhism, and Protestantism viewed as being in the
middle. They noted limitations, such as a lack of religious diversity and a lack of religious
knowledge among their participants. Chalik and colleagues (2017) discussed a lack of clarity
about how religious essentialism develops. They also found that religious essentialism decreases
with age, though they noted their essentialism-testing scenario (which religion would a child
born to Jewish parents but raised from birth by Christian parents likely join) was so strong that it
could potentially have limited the results, even among those who generally hold essentialist
views. Heiphetz and colleagues (2016) also found that religious essentialist views seemed to
decrease with age. Porter (2012) did not find a link between a participant’s religiosity and their
essentialism, but also cited a lack of diversity, religious or otherwise, in their sample. These
studies do not come to a clear consensus due to the various methodological difficulties that they
described.
In terms of essentialist views of nationality and political affiliation, current research is
even more underdeveloped. One study by Siromahov and colleagues’ (2020) found that strong
nationalist thinking correlated with essentialist beliefs while a separate study published in the
same year by Siromahov (2020) directly connected essentialism to nationalism. Wilson (2018)
found that affective polarization (the tendency to dislike and distrust members of other political
groups) was also associated with political essentialism. Few studies examined the roles of
categorical identity or centrality in predicting essentialism.
Given the apparent gap that exists in the research concerning these other types of
essentialism, as well as their associations with each other and social identity (membership or
centrality), I aimed to investigate the associations between essentialist beliefs for other important
social identities. Unlike gender, sexuality, race, or sex, the identities of religion, political
affiliation, and nationality are neither tied to any explicit physiological characteristics (e.g. race)
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nor are they widely seen as having an entirely biological basis (e.g. sexual orientation).
Additionally, religion and politics have an element of choice that is not present in most of the
other examined identities. This raises the question of whether or not essentialist thinking towards
these identities manifests in the same way as it does with more biologically or
physiologicallybased identities.
The Current Research
Given Chaney & Sanchez (2018)’s findings that racial and gender essentialism correlate
with each other, I hypothesize that this applies more broadly to other forms of essentialist beliefs.
I also hypothesize, based on Satherley and colleagues’ (2020) findings that political identity
centrality is the strongest predictor of polarization, that political identity centrality also correlates
with political essentialism. This is because both political polarization and political essentialism
focus on extreme perceived differences between two political identities. Furthermore, I predict
that this applies to the other identities as well, since I expect that the more important a personal
identity is to an individual, the more you would expect them to view out-group identities as
distinct from their group. Finally, I hypothesize Republican political identity positively correlates
with essentialist views of national identity, based on numerous findings of the correlation
between anti-immigrant/refugee views and conservatism (Cowling et al., 2019; Davidov et al.,
2020). If individuals see the identity of the nation as being threatened by out-groups, this would
mean that they see the nation as having a distinct, immutable character; these are beliefs directly
related to essentialism. Based on these expectations and the previous literature, I expect that:
1. Having essentialist attitudes about one identity group will correlate with having
essentialist attitudes about other identities.

ESSENTIALISM OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL IDENTITIES
14
2. The more important an identity is to one’s sense of self (i.e. higher identity centrality),
the more likely they will be to hold essentialist attitudes about that identity.
3. Republican identity (both categorical membership and higher centrality) will positively
correlate with essentialist views of national identity.
Method
Participants
The study utilized a convenience sample of 294 participants. The anticipated sample size
was determined by a power analysis, using G Power for Windows; correlations were assumed to
be at or above .2, with an effect size of q = .3, and an expected power of .8 (Faul et al., 2007).
Participants were acquired through James Madison University’s psychology subject pool.
The study required a diverse range of participants, meaning that no identities or other factors
were either required or used as disqualifying criteria, besides the requirement that all participants
be at least 18 years of age, reside within the U.S., and agree to the informed consent statement, in
order to be in compliance with Institutional Review Board (IRB) criteria. Participants were
compensated with one course research credit for their time. The study took approximately 15-20
minutes to complete. I expected the majority of my participants would be American. Therefore,
they were asked if they are American, and if not, had the option to self-describe. For religious
affiliation, some write-in responses after selecting “None of the Above” were placed into the
most sensible category (for example “None” into Atheist/Agnostic). Additionally, Multiple
participants put a response along the lines of “Christian,” “General Christian,” or
“Nondenominational Christian.” These responses were placed in Evangelical, the most common
category of Christianity within the United States (Pew, 2020). The sample was mostly White, not
Hispanic/Latin American, female, and heterosexual/straight, with a trend toward being more
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democratic and split between being either atheist/agnostic or Catholic, in terms of the most
numerous identity groups. See Table 1 for demographic information about the sample.

Table 1
Demographics
Baseline Characteristic

n

%

Race
Asian

18

6.12

Black

21

7.14

Multi-racial

18

6.12

Native American

4

1.36

Polynesian/Pacific Islander 4

1.36

White

249 84.69

None of the above

8

2.72

Hispanic/Latin American

26

9.00

Ethnicity

Not Hispanic/Latin American 263 91.00
Gender
Male

93

Female

32.18

190 65.74

Non-binary

4

1.38

None of the above

2

Democrat

114 38.78

Republican

80

.69

Political Identity

27.21
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Libertarian

7

2.38

Green

4

1.36

Independent

48

16.33

None of the above

35

11.90

Heterosexual/Straight

237 82.01

Homosexual/Gay/Lesbian

7

2.42

Bisexual

31

10.73

Pansexual

9

3.11

Asexual

2

.69

None of the above

3

1.04

Mainline Protestant

39

13.49

Evangelical

48

16.61

Catholic

93

32.18

Jewish

10

3.46

Muslim

2

.69

Buddhist

1

.35

Atheist/Agnostic
None of the above

85
11

29.41
3.81

Sexual Orientation

Religious Affiliation

Procedure
Participants were recruited through the JMU subject pool, using the SONA systems
signup platform, under the study name Beliefs About Social Identity Groups. Participants were
allowed to complete the study online and on their own time.
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Prior to the beginning of the survey, informed consent was received from all of the
participants, by having them agree to a statement at the beginning of the survey. Participants
were not initially told that the study involves measuring essentialism, but only that the survey
pertains to beliefs about social identity groups, so as not to potentially prime essentialist or
nonessentialist beliefs. The informed consent statement stated that participants were allowed to
skip any questions they did not feel comfortable answering. They could also end the study early
without penalty.
The study asked for a variety of demographic information for the purpose of drawing
correlational links between different identities of the participants and their essentialist beliefs.
These questions included race, ethnicity, gender, political identity, sexual orientation, religion,
and nationality. They then answered questions about their identity centrality for their political
identity, religion, and nationality, respectively, before answering a set of questions measuring
essential beliefs towards those same three identities. Afterwards, they were debriefed on the full
purpose of the study and hypotheses, before they exited the survey and received their course
credit. Participants automatically received course credit through this system, once their
participation was verified.
Based on the nature of the tasks and the minimal risk to the participants, the study was
exempt from full IRB review. In terms of ethical considerations, given the potentially damaging
nature of this data if tied to a specific individual, strict anonymity was maintained. Additionally,
thinking about one’s potentially marginalized identities or comparing different identities to each
other, while focusing on essentialism, could potentially be distressing for some individuals.
Therefore, I included mental health resources in the debrief.
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Measures
Centrality
The survey contained individual measures of identity centrality for each of the identities
of interest, using an adapted version of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) sub-scale for importance
to identity, from the Collective Self-Esteem Scale. This subscale was later renamed “identity
centrality,” in their future work, and many other authors have adapted this into similar measures
of identity centrality for specific identity groups (Blankenship et al., 2021; Scottham et al.,
2008). Participants responded to a list of statements for each identity, using a Likert Scale from 1
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). An example item from this sub-scale (for national
identity) would be “In general, I'm glad to be a member of my national identity group.” The full
scale items can be found in Appendix A. Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranged from .73-.86 for
the original sub-scales and .84-.90 for the current study.
Essentialism
To measure essentialism, this study utilized a questionnaire inspired by the
Genetic
Essentialism Scale for Race (Yaylacı et al., 2019) and the Essentialist Beliefs About Social Class
Categories Scale (Kraus & Keltner, 2013). The GESR includes 15 questions, with response
options on a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with a “Don’t
Know” option. The EBASCCS included 10 questions, with response options on a seven-point
Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”
Using these original measures as a guide, nine experimenter-adapted questions were
presented for each of the identity groups: political identity, religious identity, and national
identity. The authors of the original scales found evidence of convergent validity and
discriminant validity. Construct validity was supported by sensible relationships between the
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original scales and social policy-relevant measures. Item 4 (“There are genetic differences among
[identity], but they are biologically insignificant”) was dropped from each scale after it was
determined that confusion over its meaning significantly lowered reliability. It would appear that
both high and low essentialist thinkers could interpret the statement in a way that they agreed
with. Originally, the GESR had an alpha of .73 while the EBASCCS had one of .74. For my own
scales, political affiliation and national essentialism both had alphas of .71 and religious
essentialism had one of .72.
I chose to exclude variations on certain questions from the original scales, such
as
“Everyone’s ancestors originally came from Africa” and “A person’s social class is easy to
figure out even when they are from another country,” because they were not easily adapted for
my three identities of interest. Example items for each included: “Members of certain political
identities may be smarter than others because of genetics,” “It is easy to figure out another
person’s religion just by looking at them,” and “Children probably learn about nationality
automatically, without much help from adults.” A complete list of questions and response
options can be found in Appendix B.
Data Analysis Plan
Preliminary Data Analysis
I first assessed general levels of participants’ essentialist beliefs, by finding means and
standard deviations. I then determined if participants of different identity groups differed in their
essentialist beliefs and identity centrality for each corresponding identity, where there was
enough variation (political affiliation and religion), using paired samples t-tests. I did not test for
group-level differences in essentialism by national identity, as only 15 participants were nonAmerican. These results can be seen in Tables 2.
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Hypothesis Testing Analysis
To investigate hypothesis one, I tested for correlations between the three different
essentialist beliefs (political, religious, and national), utilizing Pearson’s r correlations. For
hypothesis two, I tested for associations between the identity centrality scores for the three target
identities and essentialism of the corresponding identity, using Pearson’s r correlations, focusing
on identity centrality as the independent variable and the essentialism as the dependent variable.
For hypothesis three, I first used a t-test, to examine whether there were differences between
Republicans, Democrats and Independents in their ratings of national identity essentialism. Next,
I tested for the correlation between Republican identity centrality and national essentialism.
Results
Descriptives
Means were consistent across the respective variables. Centrality means differed by .14
and essentialism means differed by.52, across different groups. The participants therefore had
very similar levels of centrality and essentialism, respectively, towards all three of the identities.
Full descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2
Descriptives
Variable

Mean

SD

Alpha

Centrality
Religious

4.63

1.01

.90

National

4.62

.86

.84

Political

4.48

.82

.87

Religious

2.15

.64

.72

Essentialism
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National

2.67

.69

.71

.71
One-way ANOVAs were performed to compare the effect of specific group membership
Political

2.23

.65

on the respective essentialism and identity centrality (e.g., the effect of political group
membership on political essentialism). Democrats, Republicans, and Independents had high
enough n to examine for political affiliation, while Mainline Protestants, Evangelicals, Catholics,
and Atheists/Agnostics were numerous enough to examine for religion. A one-way ANOVA
revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in political identity centrality between
at least two groups (F(2, 238) = 9.20, p < .001). The same type of test revealed that there was a
statistically significant difference between at least two of the religious groups both in terms of
religious identity centrality (F(3, 261) = 23.52, p < .001) and religious essentialism (F(3, 261) =
9.92, p = .00). Tukey’s HSD Test for multiple comparisons found that the mean value of
religious identity centrality was significantly different between Mainline Protestants and
Atheists/Agnostics (p < .001, 95% C.I.: [.60, 1.51]), between Evangelicals and both
Atheists/Agnostics (p < .001, 95% C.I.: [.80, 1.65]) and Catholics (p = .01, 95% C.I. = [.08,
.92]), and between Catholics and Atheists/Agnostics (p < .001, 95% C.I. = [.37, 1.08]). Catholics
(M = 4.73, SD = .93), Mainline Protestants (M = 5.07, SD = 1.16), and Evangelicals (M = 5.23,
SD = .87) all viewed their respective religious identities as more central to how they view
themselves than Atheists/Agnostics (M = 4.01, SD = .77), p < .001 in all instances. Evangelicals
also had greater religious identity centrality than Catholics in this regard, with p = .01. The same
test found that the mean value of religious essentialism was significantly different between
Evangelicals and Atheists/Agnostics (p = .02, 95% C.I. = [.04, .61]), between Catholics and
Atheists/Agnostics (p = .00, 95% C.I. = [.00, .25]), and between Mainline Protestants and
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Catholics (p = .04, 95% C.I. = [-.62, -.01]). Evangelicals (M = 2.20, SD = .57) and Catholics (M
= 2.37, SD = .51) were both more likely to have religious essentialist beliefs than
Atheists/Agnostics (M = 1.88, SD = .55), p = .02 and p = .00, respectively. Catholics (M = 2.37,
SD = .) were also more likely to have religious essentialist beliefs than Mainline Protestants (M =
2.06, SD = ). The same test found that the mean value of political identity centrality was
significantly different between Democrats and Independents (p < .001, 95% C.I. = [.26, .93]),
and Republicans and Independents (p < .01, 95% C.I. = [.16, .87]). Democrats (M = 4.65, SD =
.81) and Republicans (M = 4.57, SD = .89) both viewed their political identity as more important
to their sense of identity than Independents (M = 4.06, SD = .66), p < .001 and p < .01,
respectively. There was no statistically significant difference between any other groups for the
given dependent variables (p > .05 in all instances).
Correlations
Table 4 demonstrates the relationships between various identity centrality and essentialism scales
for the three studied identities. Significant, positive correlations were found between each form
of essentialism. Significant, positive correlations were also found between each form of identity
centrality. An unexpected significant, negative correlation was also found between political
identity centrality and religious essentialism.
Table 3
Correlations
Variable
Rel IC
Rel IC
Pol IC

Pol IC
.23***

.23***

Nat IC

Rel Ess

Pol Ess

Nat Ess

.41***

.05

.03

.07

.21***

-.20**

-.09

-.11
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Natl IC

.41***

.21***

.05

Rel Ess

.05

-.20**

.05

Pol Ess

.03

-.09

.02

Nat Ess

.07

-.11

.11

.01

.11

.73***

.57***

.73***
.57***

.52***
.52***

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001
Hypothesis Testing
My first hypothesis was that having essentialist attitudes about one identity group would
correlate with having essentialist attitudes about other identities. The results support this, with
the correlation between each pair of essentialist attitudes being significant and ranging from .52
to .73, with p < .001 in all instances.
My second hypothesis was that the more important an identity is to one’s sense of self
(i.e. higher identity centrality), the more likely they would be to hold essentialist attitudes about
that identity. There was a trend toward being significant for national identity. The correlations
for the political and religious variables were negative and positive, respectively, but neither were
significant. The correlation between national identity centrality and essentialism trended towards
significance at .11, with a p-value of .05.
My third hypothesis was that Republican identity (categorical membership and centrality)
would both positively correlate with essentialist views of national identity. The findings partially
supported this hypothesis. In terms of categorical membership, Republican identity, compared
both to not being Republican, and to being a Democrat, respectively, correlated with national
essentialism. There was also no correlation between political identity centrality and national
essentialism among Republicans. This information can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4
Additional Correlations for
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Hypothesis 3
Variable
National Essentialism
Republicans vs. Others

.14*

Republicans vs. Democrats

.15*

Republican Identity Centrality

-.12

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Discussion
My first hypothesis stated that essentialist attitudes towards different identity groups
would correlate with each other. This was supported by the results. Each of the three types of
essentialism was found to have significant correlations with each of the other types. If someone
had high essentialist views towards one identity, they would likely have high essentialist views
towards the other two. This was unsurprising, as it was in line with prior research on the high
correlation between various other types of essentialism (e.g. Chaney & Sanchez, 2018).
However, my results are unique in that they focused on identity groups that lack socially
recognized physiological or biological markers, which has generally not been the case in most
previous research on essentialism. While I did not initially set out to examine it, I also found that
identity centrality for the three different identity groups correlated with each other. Combined,
this could suggest that the ways people perceive these three different identities, both in
themselves and in others, are connected. This is interesting, as they are united by lacking
physiological or biological markers but separated by the degree of choice in one’s membership
in the group (with one’s birth nationality, at least, being generally seen as less of a choice than
one’s religion or political affiliation). A higher essentialism score would indicate that the
participant disagrees with the assertion that these identities are non-biological, given that many
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of the questions in the scale revolved around genes, appearance, and other physical differences.
However, it is worth remembering that even the biological and physical factors supposedly
apparent in race and gender have more genetic and behavioral significance applied to them than
is actually the case in real life. Perhaps the same focus on inconsequential physical differences
that leads to gender and racial essentialism is also applied to these three identities by essentialist
thinkers.
Nationality is the only identity where I found a trend towards significant correlation
between identity centrality and essentialism. This was in line with Siromahov’s 2020 findings
that strong nationalist thinking correlated with essentialist beliefs. I was surprised not to find a
correlation between identity centrality and essentialism for religion and political affiliation,
especially for the political identity centrality and political essentialism results. Given Satherley
and colleagues’ (2020) findings that political identity centrality is the strongest predictor of
polarization, I expected this to be highly positively correlated. Perhaps polarization and
essentialism are not as related as I initially assumed. Additionally, as previously mentioned, one
key difference between nationality and religion or political affiliation is that of choice. One does
not choose where they are born and changing nationalities generally has more barriers than
joining a different religion or political affiliation. Perhaps this difference contributes to why
people apparently perceive nationality differently. Additionally, due to my participant pool, I
was only able to survey Americans. It is possible that Americans with high national identity
centrality are especially extreme in their beliefs on the differences between nationalities, when
compared to their beliefs about religions or political affiliations.
The findings that Republican identity (both compared to not being a Republican and
compared to being a Democrat) correlated with essentialist views of national identity were
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unsurprising, given the numerous findings of the correlation between anti-immigrant/refugee
views and conservatism (Cowling et al., 2019; Davidov et al., 2020).
As for why this was not the case for high Republican identity centrality, it is possible that
anti-immigrant and refugee views are not as linked to national essentialism as I had assumed.
Immigrants may be considered unacceptable by conservatives not because they are perceived as
biologically different, but for some other reason, such as alleged safety concerns or a belief that
they will take resources. There is also the possibility that the Republicans of James Madison
University, which leans liberal as an institution, are not as conservative (or differently
conservative), compared to the average Republican. Their beliefs may not fully align with a more
restrictive view of national identity. Binder (2014) wrote on how young conservatives within and
across different schools can differ dramatically in beliefs and tactics. This indicates that the
Republicans of any one school may not be very reflective of many of their peers.
Limitations
There are a number of important limitations to discuss in the context of the current
research. Drawing subjects exclusively from James Madison University’s subject pool threatens
external validity, as JMU’s psychology student population may not be a good representation of
Americans or people in general. For example, my subject pool was disproportionately White. As
an extension of this, the study was performed on the final testing day of the semester. This means
that the population used could be disproportionately likely to wait until the last minute on things.
There is a possibility that this population has less nuanced perspectives or conscientiousness,
when it comes to thinking about identities, compared to those who might complete surveys at the
beginning of the semester. As there was no experimental manipulation, a causal claim cannot be
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supported by the present research; only a correlational claim can be inferred, limiting internal
validity.
Future Directions
Since a positive correlation between different essentialist mindsets was found, future
research can expand on this study of associations between these identities and other forms of
essentialist thinking, such as for race, gender, disability-status, or sexual orientation. This would
allow researchers to further interrogate how different types of essentialist views are related to
each other. Additionally, future research on the correlation between national identity centrality
and national essentialism could compare responses of Americans to participants from other
countries. Finally, future research on Republican identity could further examine the antecedents
for nationalism in Republicans. If Republican identity centrality is not a driving force, further
studies could investigate what is. They could also examine the Republican/Other and
Republican/Democrat difference in more detail.
Conclusion
This study broke new ground in investigating under-studied varieties of essentialism,
helping push the overall essentialism discussion beyond just gender and race. The results of the
study demonstrated that national, political, and religious essentialist beliefs correlate with each
other, and that national, political, and religious identity centralities also correlate with each other,
broadening the general understanding of these identities. The results of this study also found a
potential link between national identity centrality and national essentialism, indicating a possible
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antecedent for political and religious essentialism. Furthermore, this study examined the
relationship between Republican identity and essentialist views towards nationality, finding
that Republicans and others and Republicans and Democrats differ in this regard. In doing so, it
contributed to a better understanding of the national political landscape.
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Appendix A
National Identity Centrality
INSTRUCTIONS: We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of
such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one of those particular
groups, specifically your national identity,, and respond to the following statements on the basis
of how you feel about that group and your memberships in it. There are no right or wrong
answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions.
Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:
Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Somewhat Neutral Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
Please indicate your national identity group or nationality (e.g. “American,” “Mexican,” or
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“Canadian”):
________________________________
1. I am a worthy member of my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I often regret that I belong to my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Overall, my national identity group is considered good by others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Overall, my national identity group has very little to do with how I feel about myself. * 1
234567
5. I feel I don't have much to offer to my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. In general, I'm glad to be a member of my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Most people consider my national identity group, on the average, to be more ineffective
than other national groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. My national identity group is an important reflection of who I am. * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. I am a cooperative participant in my nation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Overall, I often feel that my national identity group is not worthwhile. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. In general, others respect my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. My national identity group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. * 1
234567
13. I often feel I'm a useless member of my nation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. I feel good about being a member of my national identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. In general, others think that members of my national identity group are unworthy. 1 2 3
4567
16. In general, belonging to my national identity group is an important part of my self
image.
*1234567
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* Indicates items that are part of the centrality sub-scale.

Religious Identity Centrality
INSTRUCTIONS: We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of
such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one of those particular
groups, specifically your religious identity, and respond to the following statements on the basis
of how you feel about that group and your memberships in it. There are no right or wrong
answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions.
Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:
Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Somewhat Neutral Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
Please indicate your religious identity (e.g. “Hindu,” “Catholic,” or “Atheist/Agnostic”):
________________________________
17. I am a worthy member of my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. I often regret that I belong to my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Overall, my religious identity group is considered good by others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Overall, my religious identity group has very little to do with how I feel about myself. *
1
234567
21. I feel I don't have much to offer to my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. In general, I'm glad to be a member of my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Most people consider my religious identity group, on the average, to be more ineffective
than other religious groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. My religious identity group is an important reflection of who I am. * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

ESSENTIALISM OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL IDENTITIES
37
25. I am a cooperative participant in my religion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Overall, I often feel that my religious identity group is not worthwhile. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. In general, others respect my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. My religious identity group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. *
1
234567
29. I often feel I'm a useless member of my religion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. I feel good about being a member of my religious identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. In general, others think that members of my religious identity group are unworthy. 1 2 3
4
567
32. In general, belonging to my religious identity group is an important part of my self
image. * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
* Indicates items that are part of the centrality sub-scale.
Political Identity Centrality
INSTRUCTIONS: We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of
such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one of those particular
groups, specifically your political identity, and respond to the following statements on the basis
of how you feel about that group and your memberships in it. There are no right or wrong
answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions.
Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:
Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Somewhat Neutral Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
Please indicate your political identity group or nationality (e.g. “Democrat,” “Republican,” or
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“Green”):
________________________________
33. I am a worthy member of my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. I often regret that I belong to my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Overall, my political identity group is considered good by others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. Overall, my political identity group has very little to do with how I feel about myself. * 1
234567
37. I feel I don't have much to offer to my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. In general, I'm glad to be a member of my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. Most people consider my political identity group, on the average, to be more ineffective
than other national groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. My political identity group is an important reflection of who I am. * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41. I am a cooperative participant in my political group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. Overall, I often feel that my political identity group is not worthwhile. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. In general, others respect my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. My political identity group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. * 1
234567
45. I often feel I'm a useless member of my political group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46. I feel good about being a member of my political identity group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47. In general, others think that members of my political identity group are unworthy. 1 2 3 4
567
48. In general, belonging to my political identity group is an important part of my self image.
*1234567
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* Indicates items that are part of the centrality sub-scale.
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Appendix B
Political Identity
1. Members of certain political identities may be smarter than others because of genetics.*
2. People of all political identities share most of the same genes.*(R)
3. People from different political identities can have the same physical traits or
features.*(R)
4. There are genetic differences among political identities, but they are biologically
insignificant.*(R)
5. It is easy to figure out another person’s political identity just by looking at them.
6. I think even if everyone wore the same clothing, people would still be able to tell your
political identity.
7. Other people’s political identity is easy to figure out.
8. Children probably learn about political identity automatically, without much help from
adults.
9. A person’s political identity does not change from their political identity at birth.
Religious Belief
1. Members of certain religions may be smarter than others because of genetics.*
2. People of all religions share most of the same genes.*(R)
3. People from different religions can have the same physical traits or features.*(R) 4. There
are genetic differences among religions, but they are biologically insignificant.*(R)
5. It is easy to figure out another person’s religion just by looking at them.
6. I think even if everyone wore the same clothing, people would still be able to tell your
religion.
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7. Other people’s religion is easy to figure out.
8. Children probably learn about religion automatically, without much help from adults.
9. A person’s religion does not change from their religion at birth.
Nationality
1. Members of certain nationalities may be smarter than others because of genetics.*
2. People of all nationalities share most of the same genes.*(R)
3. People from different nationalities can have the same physical traits or features.*(R)
4. There are genetic differences among nationalities, but they are biologically
insignificant.*(R)
5. It is easy to figure out another person’s nationality just by looking at them.
6. I think even if everyone wore the same clothing, people would still be able to tell your
nationality.
7. Other people’s nationality is easy to figure out.
8. Children probably learn about nationality automatically, without much help from adults.
9. A person’s nationality does not change from their nationality at birth.
The increasing points on the Likert scale will be assigned a value ranging from 1 to 5.
Questions marked with “*” come from the GESR. Questions with no “*” come from the
EBASCCS. Questions marked with “(R)” are reversed. The higher the number, the more
intensely it demonstrates an essentialist mindset, unless it is reversed, in which case the opposite
is true. Each subject will receive an average intensity score for each of the three factors. When
combined with the demographic results, we can see both how common essentialist mindsets are
in general, and what identities they most correlate with.
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Appendix C
Please select your age:
● 18-100
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your race:
● White
● Black
● Asian
● Native American
● Polynesian/Pacific Islander
● Multi-racial
● None of the above, with a fill-in option
Please select the option that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your ethnicity:
● Hispanic/Latin American
● Not Hispanic/Latin American
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your gender:
● Man
● Woman
● Non-binary
● None of the above, with the option to self-describe
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your political
identity:
● Democrat
● Republican
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● Libertarian
● Green
● Independent
● None of the above, with the option to self-describe
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your sexual
orientation:
● Heterosexual/straight
● Homosexual/gay/lesbian
● Bisexual
● Pansexual
● Asexual
● None of the above, with the option to self-identify
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your religion:
● Mainline Protestant
● Evangelical
● Catholic
● Jewish
● Muslim
● Buddhist
● Hindu
● Atheist/Agnostic
● None of the above, with the option to self-identify
Please select the option(s) that best match how you see yourself, in terms of your nationality:
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● American
● Other, with the option to self-describe

